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Newton’s methodology for physics was an overwhelming success.  But the forces 
which he introduced left Nature still without meaning or value . . . . A dead 
nature aims at nothing.  It is the essence of life that it exists for its own sake, as 
the intrinsic reaping of value.   
 
A. N. Whitehead Modes of Thought1  
 
Introduction 
 
In his long career, Whitehead was, variously, a mathematician, speculative 
physicist, historian of science, philosopher of science, and philosopher in his 
own right.  As such, he occupies a perhaps unique place within recent western 
thought.  Not only did he advance scientific thought, he also developed a novel, 
systematic philosophical understanding of science based on a deep historical 
appreciation of both its theoretical premises and its practical procedures.  
Whitehead did not dismiss science, he did not see it as divorced from 
philosophy, nor did he accept the premises which, he maintained, still inform 
much of modern science.   One of Whitehead’s great achievements, which will 
be taken up later in this paper, is his insistence that science, philosophy, the 
humanities, and social theory all require a renewed conception of nature (in the 
broadest sense of the word), one which goes beyond strict scientific limitations, 
beyond any form of biological essentialism or  reliance upon some notion of the 
ultimate laws of physics or nature.  Through his philosophy of organism, 
Whitehead aims to develop a concept of nature that is able to incorporate all 
existence, thereby bringing together the empirical, the material, the social, the 
aesthetic, and thinking beings.   
 
Deleuze shares with Whitehead the desire to develop a new ontological 
approach, one which goes beyond simplistic divisions or catergorizations of the 
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world into subject-object, natural-social, dead-alive, and so on.  Like 
Whitehead, he was also keenly aware of the need to situate such philosophical 
endeavours within a full appreciation of the history of philosophy.  
Furthermore, he was acutely aware of the need to uncover and develop the 
inextricable links, which have often remained hidden, between this history and 
other realms of thought and practice, such as the political, the social, and the 
aesthetic.   
 
To attempt to outline all the similarities and dissimilarities, conjunctions and 
disjunctions between Whitehead and Deleuze is beyond the scope of this paper.2 
 Yet it would seem clear that their inter-relations and dual attempts to develop 
what might be termed a non-essentialist ontology is both of relevance and 
importance across a range of fields at the start of the twenty-first century. In a 
time of academic uncertainty and renewal--with the increasing focus on inter-
disciplinarity and the increasing recognition of the need to reconsider the 
apparently unbridgeable dichotomy between the natural and the social, the need 
to move beyond overly culturalist or Foucauldian accounts of subjectivity, the 
need to renew and develop the inter-relations of science and philosophy--
Whitehead and Deleuze offer striking interventions which may prove fruitful for 
researchers thinking through a range of problems.  One concrete example of this 
is the recent conference (May, 2005) devoted solely to Whitehead and Deleuze, 
organized by the University of Leuven (Belgium) and held at the Royal Flemish 
Academy of Arts and Science in Brussels.  This brought together an eclectic 
group of scholars from all over the world, working on Whitehead and Deleuze, 
and demonstrated both the extent and depth of their current impact across 
philosophy, cultural theory, literature and literary criticism, mathematics, and 
sociology and social theory.  Whilst this paper will not be able to do justice to all 
such ramifications, it is hoped that it will operate as an introduction to some of 
the more significant aspects of the perspective Whitehead and Deleuze share.  In 
particular, it will focus on their understanding of the processual character of 
materiality or physicality and the challenge they pose to customary scientific 
conceptions of these.  It will also consider the status of subjectivity within their 
work (in relation to their understanding of materiality) and will conclude with a 
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brief example of how their work might be applied within social theory to provide 
a forceful account of the inter-relatedness of materiality and subjectivity in the 
world.          
 
The Bifurcation of Nature 
 
Throughout his philosophical career Whitehead was intent on arguing against 
what he described as the bifurcation of nature.  He describes this position as 
follows: 
[One] way of phrasing this theory which I am arguing against is to bifurcate 
nature into two divisions, namely into the nature apprehended in awareness 
and the nature which is the cause of awareness.  The nature which is in fact 
apprehended in awareness holds within it the greenness of the trees, the song of 
the birds, the warmth of the sun, the hardness of the chairs, and the feel of the 
velvet.  The nature which is the cause of awareness is the conjectured system of 
molecules and electrons which so affects the mind as to produce the awareness 
of apparent nature. 
 
Whitehead views the tacit acceptance of such a theory as having severe 
consequences for our understanding of nature.  Furthermore, it has led to the 
division of academic inquiry into discrete realms which deal with subject 
matters so diverse, so different, that they are unable to communicate.  Indeed, 
they may as well be talking about different universes.  For example, the material 
(natural) world has been set out as the province of science.  Subjectivity and the 
experiences and inter-relations of thinking subjects (humans) have been given 
over to social theory or the humanities.  This has led to problems for both fields 
of inquiry.  Within science, the world has become (epistemologically speaking) 
an inert, external entity divorced from the experiences of thinking subjects.  
Nature, in its broadest sense, has been reduced to a lifeless realm, devoid of 
feeling and value; the position and status of thinking subjects within such a 
scheme has become unexplainable.  A conceptual wedge has been driven 
between a supposedly objective world without meaning upon which science 
reports and the ‘meaningful’ realms of human existence with which social 
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theory or the humanities deal.  This has also produced both epistemological and 
practical problems for the latter disciplines in their attempts to account for the 
physicality and actuality of subjects and subjectivity.  For example, sociologists 
may have succeeded in the important task of uncovering the political and 
ideological dimensions of gender but, as has recently been pointed out, this still 
seems to leave biological ‘sex’ firmly in the control of the ‘real’ sciences.3  I shall 
return to this in the conclusion to this paper.  For the moment, put simply, there 
is still a tendency amongst many to feel that, despite the best and most 
sophisticated efforts of literary theorists, philosophers, sociologists, 
anthropologists and so on, science (and scientists) still maintain some kind of a 
direct access to the ‘real reality’ (be it in terms of genes, illness etc.).  And, this 
direct access is somehow tied to the priority that modern science has given to 
describing the very physicality of the world and indeed life.    
 
It is this tension between the very physicality of existence, to which it would 
seem only science has full claim, and the experiences of subjects, which thereby 
become the purview of the humanities and social theory, that, this paper will 
claim, Whitehead and Deleuze may enable us to move beyond.  As such, the 
remainder of the paper will analyse how both Whitehead and Deleuze reject the 
division of the complexity of existence into over-simplified categories such as 
the natural and the social.  They invite science, social theory and the humanities 
to re-consider the ontological assumptions which subtend their epistemological 
positions.  One important consequence of both Whitehead and Deleuze’s work, 
which will be drawn out in the concluding section, is the need for a dramatic 
reconsideration of status of both social and physical existence by going beyond 
any simple distinction between the realms of the natural and social.  In short, 
this paper will ultimately contend that it is the on-going and eventful process of 
existence which is social and it is within this that the subjects and objects of 
nature come to be (and are passed beyond).             
 
Whitehead’s Actual Entities 
 
Whilst, it is, perhaps, well known that Deleuze develops an ontology which 
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avoids foundationalism or essentialism by prioritizing becoming over being, it is 
sometimes held that such a prioritization is evoked at the expense of notions of 
materiality or physicality.  In such readings, flux and flight are figured as the 
mainstays of Deleuze’s ontological position.  Such readings tend to concentrate 
on passages such as the following: 
 
We have to reflect for a long time to understand what it means to make an 
affirmation of becoming.  In the first place it is doubtless to say that there is only 
becoming . . . . But we must also affirm the being of becoming, we say that 
becoming affirms being or that being is affirmed in becoming.4  
 
The over-emphasis on such statements has led many to miss the point that 
whilst the focus on becoming is an integral element of Deleuze’s philosophy, he 
also develops a robust account of the very physicality of existence.  This paper 
will demonstrate that Whitehead’s less well-known ontology also prioritizes 
becoming over being, but is, perhaps, clearer in advocating a notion of 
physicality.  His emphasis on “stubborn fact”5 is always brought to the fore and, 
as such, might serve not only as a helpful counter-balance to those who focus on 
what might be termed the ‘joy of flux’ but also points to the importance of 
materiality and physicality within Deleuze’s ontology.   This is not, ultimately, to 
dismiss scientific accounts but to enable both science and other forms of theory 
to investigate the processual character of all existence.     
 
For Whitehead, stubborn fact is comprised of ‘actual entities’, “the final real 
things of which the world is made up.”6  Hence, Whitehead holds, analysis must 
start with this stubborn fact, with the very stuff of the universe considered as 
individuated items of matter or materiality.  “Thus the ultimate metaphysical 
truth is atomism . . . But atomism does not exclude complexity and universal 
relativity.”7 However, such statements are merely the first stage in Whitehead’s 
argument.  The role of actual entities, in Whitehead’s work, is to establish a 
form of materiality which does not rely on the traditional scientific-
philosophical rendering of physicality in terms of discrete, self-identical objects: 
“the notion of the self-contained particle of matter, self-sufficient within its local 
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habitation is an abstraction.”8  Actual entities have the role of explaining the 
process of materiality.      
 
Whitehead refers to his overall system as a philosophy of organism  and, for 
him, all actual entities can be considered as ‘creatures’ which have both 
materiality and subjectivity. 
 
The philosophies of substance presuppose a subject which then encounters a 
datum, and then reacts to the datum.  The philosophy of organism presupposes 
a datum which is met with feelings, and progressively attains the unity of a 
subject.  But with this doctrine, ‘superject’ would be a better term than 
‘subject.’9    
 
In order to avoid the split between the world viewed as a physical given (and 
hence under the purview of science) that is distinct from the analytical arena of 
thinking, perceiving subjects (under the purview of the humanities), Whitehead 
offers a reconfigured conception of subjectivity.  Subjectivity is the “past hurling 
itself into a new transcendent fact.  It is the flying dart . . . hurled beyond the 
bounds of the world.”10  It is the act of being thrown from the past into the 
future which constitutes being; the being of becoming.  This will entail that at 
the human level, subjectivity11 is not so much a question of what something or 
someone is, but what they are becoming and, concomitantly, what they are 
“ceasing to be.”12  And, such subjectivity is not limited to humans.  It is an 
integral element within the universe. This, therefore, widens the grasp of what it 
means to be a creature.   However, it should be noted that Whitehead’s granting 
of subjectivity to all items of materiality does not entail some kind of 
panpsychism.  As will be discussed in more detail shortly, Whitehead’s extended 
concept of subjectivity is designed to provide a consistent philosophical 
approach which views neither objects nor subjects as primary or originary.  
Instead, experience and experiences become his ontological fulcrum. It should 
also be noted that Whitehead wants to avoid any concept of an enduring 
subjectivity which subtends different experiences;13 each subject must be 
created anew on each occasion.  “Descartes in his own philosophy conceives the 
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thinker as creating the occasional thought.  The philosophy of organism inverts 
the order, and conceives the thought as a constituent operation in the creation 
of the occasional thinker.”14
 
Actual Entities: How they come to be 
 
To summarise, Whitehead’s ontological position focuses upon process and 
becoming as the ultimate characterization of being and of materiality.  It aims to 
avoid a positing of subjects or objects as the starting point for meaning or 
existence, instead it emphasizes flux (i.e. becoming) but moves quickly to an 
account of the enduring status of materiality.  As such, it attempts to circumvent 
the traditional distinction between the fixed objects analysed by science and the 
thinking or thought of human subjects as analysed by the humanities.  Given 
that an actual entity is not a thing, as commonly conceived, and, to further 
complicate matters, is to be defined in terms of its process, Whitehead faces the 
task of offering a way into thinking about the status of such entities.  His 
response is to state that “experience involves a becoming, that becoming  means 
that something becomes, and that what becomes involves repetition 
transformed into novel immediacy.”15  For Whitehead, the emphasis is upon the 
‘how’ of becoming.  Being is neither located in the object itself nor in the subject 
which perceives it.  This leaves becoming as primary.  But this is not an inert 
becoming: it is not the mere passage of matter in flux.  The key to Whitehead’s 
concept of becoming is that each becoming occurs in a specific environment and 
in a specific fashion.  That which both enables becoming and differentiates this 
becoming from any other is the way in which the becoming unfolds.  In order to 
account for this prioritisation of the how of becoming, Whitehead introduces the 
notion of prehensions.  Literally, this term refers to how an actual entity grasps 
its environment.  Prehensions are crucial element within the Whiteheadian 
framework.  They are the means by which he explains the utterly relational 
character of existence; they describe the passage by which all entities are 
related.  “I use the term ‘prehension’ for the general way in which the occasion 
of experience can include, as part of its own essence, any other entity.”16  
Prehensions enable Whitehead to move beyond simplistic descriptions of a 
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world divided into subjects and objects and serve as the basis for his description 
of the process whereby materiality and physicality come to be.  Instead, 
prehensions enable the description of the complexity of the process whereby 
subjects are both created and create themselves through the assimilation of 
previously diverse elements.  It is in this respect that he states that every 
prehension consists of three factors: (a) the ‘subject’ which is prehending, 
namely, the actual entity in which that prehension is a concrete element; (b) the 
‘datum’ which is prehended; (c) the ‘subjective form’ which is how that subject 
prehends that datum. 
  
Hence, Whitehead’s theory of the divisibility of actual entities into prehensions 
might be characterized as follows17: ‘Someone is listening to some music 
produced through a CD player.’  The main prehensions here, according to 
Whitehead’s schema described above are: 
(a) the person listening to the music 
(b) the music that is being listened to 
(c) the manner in which the music is being listened to 
None of these elements comprises either an object or a subject as they are 
elements within the process which goes to make up an actual entity.  So it is not 
a person (or a someone) in terms of a subject who is listening.  The music that is 
being listened to is an integral element within the formation of that subject.18  
Further, it is not simply an admixture of the music and the person which makes 
up the subject.  The crucial element is the way in which the music is received.  
For example, the listener is receiving the music in an inattentive way; one is 
becoming bored.  Or, the listener is receiving the music in a relaxed manner; 
one is becoming tired.  
 
There is also an emphasis on the materiality of such prehensions.  This follows 
from Whitehead’s denial of the pre-existence of a listening subject, and his 
emphasis on the music as an integral element within the process of the real 
constitution of that subject.  Whitehead also stresses the manner in which these 
elements are combined or integrated.  None of the elements of the process is 
separate, nor do they have any ontological priority; they all go together to create 
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the specific subject, for example, a bored listener.  Of course, this is to greatly 
over-simplify (and to leap from the metaphysical to the human rather too 
quickly, perhaps) in order to make an explanatory point.  It is envisaged as the 
barest sketch of Whitehead’s ideas.  For example, what if the person is sitting in 
an uncomfortable chair, or can smell fresh coffee, or is eating bitter chocolate, 
or the light is too bright?  These will all influence not only the manner in which 
the music is received but the range of prehensions available, which in turn will 
both limit and extend the range of potential outcomes (subjects/superjects).  
However, what is crucial in this example is the utter integration of the 
prehension and the subject, and their indissolubility in terms of their actual 
existence. 
 
At the same time, Whitehead is not interested in simply describing the coming 
into existence of single entities, of one subject or superject.  His ontology is one 
which emphasizes the individuality of all becoming but only insofar as each 
becoming is situated within and emerges from a wider complex of becoming.  
This wider complex is termed, by Whitehead ‘the extensive continuum’. 
 
The Extensive Continuum 
 
“This extensive continuum is one relational complex . . . .It underlies the whole 
world, past present and future.”19  Such a statement may seem to express a 
foundationalist or essentialist perspective, in that it appears to characterize the 
extensive continuum as a ground subtending all existence.  This might seem to 
run the danger of positing a fixed, external, inert ground replete with objects, 
similar to that presumed by much of conventional science.  However, such is 
certainly not Whitehead’s position, as indicated by the term relational.  He also 
states:  “It [the extensive continuum] is not a fact prior to the world.”20  For 
Whitehead, this extensive continuum is infinite, in that it is not bounded or 
determined by any other element.  It is “‘real’ because it expresses a fact derived 
from the actual world and concerning the actual contemporary world.  All actual 
entities are related according to the determinations of this continuum.”21  It 
might be said that the concept of the extensive continuum is part of Whitehead’s 
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on-going development of his earlier work on relativity within a wider 
philosophical scheme.22  
 
The facticity of this reality results from the extensive continuum being 
comprised wholly of actual entities:  “Actual entities atomize the extensive 
continuum.”23 However, the extensive continuum considered as an 
agglomeration of actual entities refers to actual entities not in terms of process, 
in terms of their becoming but in terms of their already having become.  In his 
initial summary of his philosophy of organism, Whitehead states that,  “actual 
entities ‘perpetually perish’24 subjectively, but are immortal objectively.”25  An 
actual entity’s being lasts only as long as its becoming.  When it has become it 
dies; insofar as it is no longer becoming, it no longer has any being.  But this 
does not mean that it disappears.  On the contrary, it then becomes an element 
in the potential creation of new entities, it is established as an element which 
new becomings may use as the data for their own becoming.  As such it passes 
from being a subject to being an object.  “Thus subject and object are relative 
terms.”26  It is in this latter sense that an actual entity acquires objective 
immortality and as such constitutes an element within the extensive continuum. 
 
Following his explicit attempt to prioritise ‘stubborn fact’, Whitehead returns to 
the becoming of actual entities.  In this respect the extensive continuum 
operates as a field of potential for the becoming of an actual entity:  “In the mere 
continuum there are contrary potentialities; in the actual world there are 
definite atomic actualities determining one coherent system of real divisions 
throughout the region of actuality.”27  Thus, a distinction must be made between 
the abstract notion of potentiality, as that which informs the process and 
creativity of the universe ( i.e. the mere continuum), and the region of actuality.  
For it is the latter which comprises the contemporary actualizations of such 
potentiality within which the creation of actual entities occur.  This means that 
although Whitehead posits an unlimited potentiality throughout the universe, 
the real actualizations of such potentiality occur in reference to a world which is 
in some way bounded.  This is Whitehead’s renewed conception of nature which 
is intended to replace that which predominates within much of science, social 
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theory and the humanities.  The whole of nature has now become the realm of 
inter-related experiences of subjects (superjects).  However, Whitehead makes it 
clear that his position is not some simple refusal or denial of science:  “I assume 
as an axiom that science is not a fairy tale.”28  Instead, his ontology (and that of 
Deleuze) emphasizes the need to develop theoretical approaches which can 
describe the complex inter-relations of reality and the process by which 
materiality is attained.  A further discussion of this will be developed later 
through an analysis of the virtual and the actual.    
 
The analysis so far has outlined Whitehead’s ontological position; his attempts 
to balance facticity and becoming, individuality and extensivity, materiality and 
subjectivity.  The remainder of the paper will attempt to develop these themes 
through a comparison of his work with that of Deleuze.   It will commence by 
outlining Deleuze’s usage of the term ‘singularities’ with a view to considering 
their similarity to Whitehead’s  ‘actual entities’.  This will establish the role that 
each plays in the development of a non-essentialist ontology.   
 
Introducing Singularities 
 
As stated previously, it has often been the case that commentators have stressed 
the status of flux, flow and becoming in the work of Deleuze.  This paper holds 
that such an over-emphasis is mistaken.  In order to substantiate that claim and 
to outline the status of materiality/physicality within Deleuze’s texts, and also as 
a first move in delineating the similarities between his work and that of 
Whitehead, it is necessary to focus on his notion of singularities. 
 
In an introductory reference, Deleuze states that “Beneath the general operation 
of laws…there always remains the play of singularities.”29  This asserts their 
status as that which is not captured or explainable by customary descriptions of 
the world as a generally well-ordered place.  It also hints at their metaphysical 
priority.  This is developed when Deleuze obliquely argues that they cannot be 
contained or described by concepts and that they differ among themselves, 
indeed they are harbingers of difference.  “Specific difference . . . in no way 
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represents a universal concept (that is to say, an Idea) encompassing all the 
singularities and turnings of difference.”30   
 
This is a negative definition, in that it says how singularities are not 
immediately linked to concepts but does not positively describe the relation 
between concepts and singularities.  This negative form of definition continues 
when Deleuze states that “Singularity is beyond particular propositions no less 
than universality is beyond particular propositions.”31  Yet, singularities are 
crucial in the role they play within Deleuze’s work.  And this role is to account 
for differential distribution within what Deleuze terms the virtual, which is not 
actualized as different, is not yet individuated.  Thus:  “the distribution of 
singularities belongs entirely to the conditions of the problem, while their 
specification already refers to solutions constructed under these conditions . . . . 
The problem is at once transcendent and immanent in relation to these 
solutions.”32  Materiality is something that is attained through actualization and 
in relation to the set of ‘real’ conditions within which and from which it arises.  
In Whiteheadian terms, there is no indifferent relation between the extensive 
continuum and the actual entities which arise out of it.  Thus, in a short passage 
which echoes the work of Whitehead: “This is how, in the case of the organic, 
the process of actualisation appears simultaneously as the local differenciation 
of parts, the global formation of an internal milieu, and the solution of a 
problem posed within the field of constitution of an organism. 
 
Once again, there is no strict definition of singularities, it is not possible to work 
out what they are.  Just as actual entities play a precise role in Whitehead’s 
theory, so singularities play a specific role in Deleuze’s.33  For, as with 
Whitehead’s actual entities, they are never encountered as such.34  Singularities 
are that which becomes problematised and which consequently constitute 
individuality; in themselves they are not individuals in the usual sense, as such 
individuals are resultants.   
 
Singularities don’t express the solidity of objects, they do not exhibit the reality 
of Newtonian self-identical things.  Rather, they express reality as qualitative 
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difference.  “Singularity and intensity are terms used to articulate a thought 
robbed of the organizing principle of the individual.”35  In the same vein as 
Whitehead when he characterizes his “epochal theory of time” in terms of 
quanta—literally packages or pulses of time, superseding each other—the reality 
of such singularities does not rely upon quantitative distinctions; instead, 
singularities are different and distinguishable in terms of their intensity - they 
are quanta36.  The role of singularities is to provide “a prior metastable state . . . 
the existence of a ‘disparateness’ . . . between which potentials are 
distributed.”37  This is not yet a description of singularities, rather it is a 
description of an intensive field, a plane of immanence, an extensive continuum. 
For, like Whitehead’s extensive continuum, such a field is not a flat, uniform or 
passive expanse.  There are specificities here but they are not individual, they 
are singularities:  ”Such a pre-individual state nevertheless does not lack 
singularities: the distinctive or singular points are defined by the existence and 
distribution of potentials.  An ‘objective’ problematic field thus appears.”38 
Reality is an undulating plane, this applies no less to that reality which science 
devotes itself to.  A recognition of this (by science) might lead, not to a 
disbarring of science, but to better, fuller scientific accounts; though this may 
involve developing a different understanding and practice of science.39  
 
Deleuze’s objective problematic field describes the relations between elements 
which are not yet actual (although for Whitehead they would once have been 
actual).  However, they are still real but not in the sense of being thing-like.  
This does not mean that such a field is an inert substrate upon which actuality 
bases itself, for this field is constituted through the inter-relation of potentials.  
Just as Whitehead attempts to dispel the notion of indifferent matter which 
awaits perception or constitution, Deleuze posits a field of differentiated but 
inter-related, intensive singulars which express potentiality.   
 
For Whitehead, that which permeates and explains this processual relation of 
the extensive continuum to the actual entities which arise out of it is the concept 
of creativity.  “Creativity is the principle of novelty.  An actual occasion is a novel 
entity diverse from any entity in the ‘many’ that it unifies.  It is that ultimate 
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principle by which the many, which are the universe disjunctively, become the 
one actual occasion, which is the universe conjunctively.  The ‘creative advance’ 
is the application of this ultimate principle of creativity to each novel situation 
which it originates.”40  However, Whitehead also stresses the importance of 
repetition within this more general scheme.  That is to say, this novelty is not 
entirely new, as, within each becoming novel there is a dual repetition.  The first 
repetition is the repetition of becoming itself.  The second is that what becomes, 
in itself, repeats the universe in a novel way.  As seen earlier, Whitehead puts it 
as follows: “These various aspects can be summed up in the statement that 
experience involves a becoming, that becoming means that something becomes, 
and that what becomes involves repetition transformed into novel 
immediacy.”41  So, novelty expresses difference, the category of creativity 
encapsulates difference; it gives it its own concept.  
 
For Deleuze, it is Nietzsche rather than Whitehead, who is the writer who has 
done most to further this idea through his notion of eternal return.  Yet it is 
notable that this reading of Nietzsche fits closely with the previous analysis of 
Whitehead.  Hence,  “Returning is being, but only the being of becoming.  The 
eternal return does not bring back ‘the same’, but returning constitutes the only 
Same of that which becomes.  Returning is the becoming-identical of becoming 
itself.”42  So, returning has the same role for Deleuze as creativity does for 
Whitehead:  “The wheel in the eternal return is at once both production of 
repetition on the basis of difference and selection of difference on the basis of 
repetition.”43  However, this is not some simple, serial becoming which 
dissipates the universe into a Heraclitean flux.  Consistent instead with 
Whitehead’s “epochal theory of time,” Deleuze manages to avoid such 
dissipation through his introduction of the distinction between the virtual and 
the actual.  These concepts play a vital role within his work, and will be 
addressed throughout the remainder of this paper.   
 
The Virtual and The Actual 
 
“The virtual is opposed not to the real but to the actual.  The virtual is fully real 
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in so far as it is virtual.  Exactly what Proust said of states of resonance must be 
said of the virtual: ‘Real without being actual, ideal without being abstract’; and 
symbolic without being fictional.  Indeed, the virtual must be defined as strictly 
a part of the real object--as though the object had one part of itself in the virtual 
into which it plunged as though into an objective dimension.”44  
 
It would seem that the work of Whitehead could be helpful in refuting Alain 
Badiou’s claim that either the actual or the virtual must be granted precedence 
in terms of their claims to reality.45  It is Whitehead’s notion of the extensive 
continuum which most closely corresponds to that of the virtual.  Most 
especially, it is his discussion of the process of the creation of actual entities out 
of such a continuum and the return of these entities into the continuum as 
constituting the being of becoming that will help elucidate how the virtual and 
the actual can both be equally real and yet separate. Whitehead clearly states 
that the extensive continuum, in itself, is real but not actual, and that the 
extensive continuum does not correspond to, nor is it exhausted by, its 
actualization by actual entities; though once the extensive continuum (or the 
virtual) is actualized, it ceases to be virtual.  “Thus though everything is real, it is 
not necessarily realized in some particular set of actual occasions.”46  So, 
although Whitehead does not use the term virtual, this extensive continuum 
could be said to be virtual in the sense that “virtualities exist in such a way that 
they actualize themselves in splitting up and being divided.”47
 
”When the virtual content of an Idea is                                              actualised, the 
varieties of relation are incarnated       in distinct species while the singular 
points which      correspond to the values of one variety are      incarnated in the 
distinct parts characteristic of this      or that species.  The Idea of colour, for 
example, is      like white light which perplicates itself in the genetic      elements 
and the relations of all the colours, but is      actualised in the diverse colours 
with their      respective spaces . . . . There is even a white      society and a white 
language, the latter being that      which contains in its virtuality all the 
phonemes and      relations destined to be actualised in diverse      languages and 
in the distinctive parts of a given         language “48
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 Perhaps, regarding this somewhat difficult passage from a Whiteheadian 
perspective will both produce clarity and demonstrate the importance of reading 
Deleuze through Whitehead (and vice versa).  However, before doing so, it 
remains necessary to introduce one of Whitehead’s  more difficult technical 
terms, namely, eternal objects.  Although eternal objects play a complex and 
somewhat disputed role in Whitehead’s work, it is clear that he intends the term 
to describe the relation which the utter potentiality of the universe bears to the 
facticity of actual entities.  Hence: “The eternal objects are the pure potentials of 
the universe; and the actual entities differ from each other in their realization of 
potentials.”49  As such (and to return to the long Deleuze quote above), colors, 
as eternal objects, express the potentiality which informs nascent items of 
matter (actual entities).  Eternal objects are complex and relational, and are 
always associated with the conceptual aspect of becoming (they are hence 
closely related to the Deleuzean concept of Idea).  They are real but do not exist 
until they ingress in particular becomings (until they are actualised, hence 
moving from virtual to actual through the process of incarnating matter).  Such 
actualisation is not random, it is affected by the environment and the past of the 
actual entities into which they ingress.  Colours are always prehended in a 
certain way.  The way in which this happens depends upon the structuring of the 
organism in question.  Thus, although whiteness itself exhibits a continuity 
(there is a white society) the manner in which it is felt will differ from organism 
to organism.   
 
All subjects are alive, in that they receive and reformulate the extensive 
continuum and all communicate with each other within the extensive 
continuum, yet they are also all different.  So any description of how they feel 
and assimilate eternal objects cannot be limited to human language.  That is to 
say, although human language is clearly, in itself, communicatory, both 
Whitehead and Deleuze insist that there are other forms of communication 
which are integral to existence.  This is the role of prehensions, as discussed 
earlier; they keep what might appear as discrete in touch with other elements in 
the extensive continuum.  “Each atom is a system of all things.”50.  Therefore 
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language is one form of communication amongst many.  Hence, Deleuze asserts 
that whiteness comprises, in its virtuality, all the potential of being white, which 
will always be actualised differently according to the individual which 
incarnates whiteness.  Language is not to be distrusted, but is itself to be seen as 
diverse.   
 
As such, there will be different languages for different entities or assemblages of 
entities.  Also, within any language there will be distinctions and divisions which 
enable singularities to pass into individuals.  It is at this point that the work of 
Whitehead and Deleuze become especially pertinent for analyses of the relations 
between materiality and subjectivity, and for developing a non-essentialist 
ontology.  Now individuation becomes a matter of division.  And this division is 
not merely physical (biological division into categories such as species, genus, 
anatomical difference) but conceptual, in the Whiteheadian and Deleuzean 
sense.  That is, it is not simple social constructionism (the way different 
societies or cultures grant different meanings to certain given factors--Margaret 
Mead’s work, for example).  Nor is it complex social constructionism (where 
matter is denigrated or made inaccessible through the priority of a signifying 
system or cultural intelligibility51). Whitehead and Deleuze manage to establish 
a non-essentialist ontology by insisting upon the reality of both the extensive 
continuum or the virtual, and the actuality of contemporary existence.  Neither 
the extensive continuum nor the virtual provide an absolute ground for 
existence; they express a limited yet infinite potentiality which is neither fully 
exhausted nor realized by those individuals which arise out of it.  As stated 
above, this applies not only to philosophy but also to science; for surely science 
has always been resolutely ontological. 
 
Hence, matter, meaning, subjectivity and sense all happen at once.  They are 
neither social nor material; nor are they ultimately reducible to either one or the 
other.  The two sides are needed together.  Hence social divisions are material 
divisions and vice versa. They cannot be separated. Even this is too simplistic, 
however, for within such a scheme, neither the material or the social retain their 
usual sense.  This is both the demand and the difficulty that Whitehead and 
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Deleuze offer contemporary theory.  I shall take up this demand with a 
‘concrete’ example in the conclusion to this paper.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Just as Whitehead’s philosophy is imbued with the idea of process (of the going 
beyond each actual occasion), for Deleuze, actualization is never a complete 
rendering of the virtual: 
 
events of the surface are actualized in the present of bodies . . . by imprisoning 
first their singularities within the limits of worlds, individuals and persons.  
There is also another movement wherein the event implies something excessive 
in relation to its actualization, something that overthrows worlds, individuals 
and persons, and leaves them to the depth of the ground which works and 
dissolves them.52  
  
As has been seen, process, or the move from the virtual to the actual, never 
exhausts the creativity, force, or power which characterizes the total implication 
of matter and subjectivity in each other. Over and beyond immediate 
actualizations of events in contemporary bodies, there remains the force of the 
eventfulness of the universe which creates the future and the past in distinction 
to the present. (This is akin to Whitehead’s notion of creativity as discussed 
earlier.)  
 
Moving away from the problem posed by scientific accounts which suppose a 
fixed, external world, I now turn to the problem of the status of the human 
subject which is often taken to survey such a world.  This is not a problem for 
Whitehead and Deleuze insofar as they view the world as neither flat nor given.  
Hence, the subject does not exist prior to its orientation and instantiation in 
relation to its wider environment.  With regard to the status of subjectivity 
within such a process (see endnotes 11 and 18), both Whitehead and Deleuze, 
would deny any absolute interiority to such subjectivity; however, they would 
still make a distinction between the inside and the outside.  “The outside is not a 
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fixed limit but a moving matter animated by peristaltic movements, folds and 
foldings that together make up an inside: they are not something other than the 
outside, but precisely the inside of the outside.”53  In this sense, the outside 
works in a similar way to Whitehead’s extensive continuum.  It is out of this that 
subjects are created.  This does not mean that such subjects have an inside 
which is of a different kind to the rest of being.  These are not subjects as 
opposed to objects.  The foldings which comprise subjectivity are temporary 
renderings of an outside.  They are the public made private only insofar as this 
privacy will become public again.54  Subjectivity is a moment and a place within 
the ongoing movement of a wider field, namely the virtual or the extensive 
continuum.  For Deleuze, such subjectivity is characterized in terms of a fold.55  
Thus, each subject or fold is a social, physical and historical rendering: social in 
that it incorporates elements of the public into a singular entity; physical in that 
it is an actual rendering of elements of the universe; historical in that its 
formation arises from the prior and particular arrangement of previous folds, 
and problems within which it is situated.  As Whitehead also puts it, the world 
comprises a “circumambient space of social physical activity.”56 There is hence 
no genuine distinction between the material and the social, between subjects 
and objects; all existence is a complex combination of the two.  The gulf between 
nature as the province of science and the inter-relation of subjects as the 
province of social theory (and the humanities) has been overcome.  I shall 
conclude with a tentative example of how the work of Whitehead and Deleuze 
could be deployed within sociology.  
 
Just as some commentators a Deleuzean analysis limited to tracing flows, flights 
and deterritorialization, and reveling in fluidity, there is the parallel danger of 
focusing exclusively on Whitehead’s emphasis on process.  But it is clear that, 
contrary to any such readings, both philosophers simply view the universe as 
eventful.  Subjects and objects do appear within this eventfulness but they are 
neither primary nor originary.  As such, Whitehead and Deleuze’s emphasis on 
becoming and process could be used to investigate contemporary forms of 
actualization, not just the distinctive mobility of contemporary society. 
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For example, within current sociology and anthropology, the social is often 
considered to be some form of a flow.57  Appadurai58, in particular, presents 
migration as one of a series of disjunctive spaces of flow, which together 
constitute the global cultural economy.  But this is only half the story; it remains 
at the level of the virtual. It is possible to utilise the work of Whitehead and 
Deleuze to broaden the scope of such analyses. For viewing migration as an 
event within the process of existence is equivalent to regarding it as a resultant 
of the inter-relation of a variety of singularities. But migration is always 
actualized in states of affairs and bodies.  Contemporary analyses should 
examine the actualizations of such becomings in terms of the fixing of the 
virtual into the present, and the actualization of the event into concrete states of 
affairs and bodies. These actualizations will take the form of classifying and 
discriminating singularities into individual bodies; so that they are physically 
rendered, for instance, as either a tourist, a refugee or an asylum seeker.  These 
are not just labels or categories.  They are the hard, physical, manifestation in 
individualized bodies.  The event is thereby actualized in such a manner that 
singularities are individuated and ordered into groups in which they are deemed 
to be the same; thereby disavowing the difference within and between them, the 
difference that constitutes them in their becomings.  That is to say, a major 
aspect of the present in the UK of the early twenty-first century is the necessity 
to be physically actualized as a citizen, visitor, genuine applicant for residency, 
or illegal entrant.  These are not the only actualizations; there are others which 
cut across the space and time of the same individuated body and yet are 
actualized within a different body.  However, it will be possible to trace the 
history that links such different actualizations to the previously individuated 
body.  
 
On this view, individual subjectivity must be regarded as a twisting of a social, 
physical environment.  The physicality in question does not limit the body to its 
own immediacy, its genes, molecules, cells and so on, but opens it up, through 
the re-conceptualization of the physical; that is to say, the conceptual is to be 
seen as an integral element of the physical.  “It is even this twisting which 
defines ‘Flesh’, beyond the body proper and its objects”59: “we cannot tell with 
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what molecules the body ends and the external world begins.”60  But this is not 
a dispersal of the body, to the extent that individual renderings of it become lost 
in a wider universe of flux.  Instead, it is a question of eliciting both the 
dispersion and the sedimentation of the body, as well as of subjectivity, with 
regard to the wider social and physical environment. Such elicitings are not 
simply cultural descriptions of an already existent physical field.  Rather, they 
would constitute the description and re-description of the folds that constitute 
contemporary subjectivity.  
 
Clearly descriptions of this sort would require a subtle account of the inter-
relation of materiality and subjectivity, if they are to engage fully with the 
physicality of the body.  However, in order not to fall back into some form of 
essentialism, it is necessary that they utilise a non-essentialist ontology.   As 
such, it is hoped that by focusing on the inter-relation of Whitehead and 
Deleuze, this paper has provided a way of furthering such analyses. That 
Whitehead and Deleuze may be seen as providing a way of approaching the 
process of attaining materiality/physicality in a social environment which is 
neither counter-posed to a natural environment nor reducible to any strict 
scientific conception of a fixed, external, object-filled universe. 
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